A Protection of Pure Procedural Rights, | Lamont Rodgers

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ABSTRACT: On this essay, I argue that we should always imagine that brokers have what I name pure procedural rights. On the one hand, brokers have rights to stop their rights from being violated, rights to cease those that are violating their rights, and rights to rectification when their rights are violated. In pursuing these rights, I argue that—not less than underneath some circumstances—brokers have an obligation to tell others of the extent to which they’re ready to go in implementing these rights. This obligation is grounded in an agent’s proper to know if he’s a rights violator within the first place. There may be broad settlement that, usually, a figuring out rights violator is rightly topic to penalties that unknowing rights violators will not be. These procedural rights thus goal the epistemic house between a figuring out rights violator and an unintended rights violator.

KEYWORDS: procedural rights, Barnett, Block, Nozick, pure rights, rights

Lamont Rodgers (lamont.rodgers@hccs.edu) is professor of philosophy at Houston Neighborhood School.


On this essay, I argue that we should always imagine that brokers have what I name pure procedural rights. On the one hand, brokers have rights to stop their rights from being violated, rights to cease those that are violating their rights, and rights to rectification when their rights are violated. In pursuing these rights, I argue that—not less than underneath some circumstances—brokers have an obligation to tell others of the extent to which they’re ready to go in implementing these rights. This obligation is grounded in an agent’s proper to know if he’s a rights violator within the first place. Rights, in spite of everything, are a two-way avenue. I’ve a proper to kick you off my property, however you’ve gotten a proper to withstand that kicking in the event you’re not really on my property. I argue that you could be resist my eviction in case you have no cause to imagine that you’re trespassing. Equally, in the event you graze the sting of my garden, you don’t anticipate me to interact in an eviction of any kind, not to mention a violent one. I argue that earlier than I have interaction in any kind of eviction, I’ve to tell you that I’ll evict you. It’s because you don’t have any cause to anticipate me to implement my eviction rights in circumstances resembling this. There may be broad settlement that, usually, a figuring out rights violator is rightly topic to penalties that unknowing rights violators will not be (Nozick 1974; Mack 2006; Block 2011; Werner 2015). These procedural rights thus goal the epistemic house between a figuring out rights violator and an unintended rights violator.

Three bits of clarification are so as earlier than I start the central argument of this paper. First, I’ll assume right here that people have strong rights over their very own individuals and over the non-public property that they legitimately purchase. I may even assume that these rights entail the suitable to exclude others from accessing the property in query. If I personal my stomach, I’ll cease you from touching it. Equally, people have rights to cease rights violators. If I personal my home and also you enter it with out my permission, I’ll throw you out. Lastly, these rights entail the suitable to hunt rectification. In case you take my prized backyard gnome, I’ve a proper to see that you just return it. I can’t defend any of those positions right here.

Second, the central argument of this paper is targeted solely on displaying that there are circumstances during which people have procedural rights. I don’t deny that there could also be considerations of urgency, historical past, or the like that excuse brokers from abiding the procedural rights of others. If somebody is throttling me, I don’t have to croak out a warning earlier than, say, taking pictures that individual. Equally, if an individual is a serial rights violator, I may not have good causes to warn him earlier than utilizing pressure in opposition to him. In fact, plainly all pure rights are contingent upon elements like this.

Lastly, I don’t supply a full account of the required and enough circumstances underneath which people’ procedural rights maintain. As an alternative, my curiosity right here is in presenting an argument to indicate that such rights exist in some circumstances. The mandatory and enough circumstances for the existence of these rights is past the scope of this text.

SKEPTICISM ABOUT PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

Robert Nozick observes a sensible downside with the pure rights custom. The issue is that it focuses solely on rights themselves and never what proof we owe to people topic to punishment for violating rights. He holds that the pure rights custom “presents little steerage on exactly what one’s procedural rights are in a state of nature, on how ideas specifying how one is to behave have data constructed into their varied clauses, and so forth.” He holds that “individuals inside this custom don’t maintain that one could not defend oneself in opposition to being dealt with by unreliable or unfair procedures” (Nozick 1974, 101). It is a downside for the pure rights custom, as a result of we regularly have no idea if somebody has violated our rights, or if we have now violated theirs.

In response to this, Randy Barnett argues that “the pure rights custom does maintain or, not less than, ought to maintain…that there are not any pure procedural rights.” His argument for this focuses on the excellence between the metaphysical query of whether or not somebody has violated a proper and the epistemological query of how we will know that somebody has violated a proper.

Although solely the harmless get together could rightfully use self-defense, it’s usually unclear to impartial observers and the events concerned simply who’s harmless. Because of this there exists the sensible downside of figuring out the info of the case after which the respective rights of the disputants. However I need to stress right here that this can be a sensible query of epistemology not an ethical query. The rights of the events are ruled by the target truth scenario. The issue is to discern what the target info are, or, in different phrases, to make our subjective understanding of the info conform to the target info themselves. (Barnett 1977, 17)

What Barnett needs to indicate is {that a} process’s reliability is irrelevant to the query of whether or not a proper has been violated. As an alternative, all that issues is that the process, no matter it’s, will get the suitable reply. When it does, no rights are violated. When it doesn’t, rights are violated. He then argues, contra Nozick, that “You’ve the suitable to defend your self in opposition to all procedures if you’re harmless, in opposition to no procedures if you’re responsible.”

The precise rights of the events, then, are unaffected by the sort of process, whether or not dependable or unreliable. They’re solely affected by the end result of the process in that enforcement of an incorrect judgment violates the precise rights of the events nevertheless dependable the process is likely to be. (Barnett 1977, 17)

I confess that Barnett’s remarks simply appear to grant Nozick’s level. For the pure rights custom to be helpful in plenty of real-world circumstances, it wants to offer steerage once we have no idea if we have now proper to defend ourselves in opposition to a selected process or if our rights have been violated. Within the following part, I make three arguments in favor of procedural rights. The primary two are that there are rationales—or motivations—for such rights already within the pure rights custom. The third is that perception in procedural rights explains our reactions to a number of thought experiments during which epistemic issues bear on the permissibility of rights enforcement.

MOTIVATING PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

On this part, I supply three issues in favor of procedural rights. The primary is that such rights protect the sensible benefits of compossibility. Proponents of pure rights usually lament the proliferation of rights that has occurred for the reason that center of the 20 th century (Steiner 1977, 1995; Lomasky 1987, 4; Block 2011). One of many many criticisms these theorists make of “new” rights, resembling the suitable to healthcare, paid trip time, and so forth, is that they appear to introduce rigidity right into a system of rights. When you’ve got a proper to healthcare and I’m the one one that can administer it, do you’ve gotten a proper to pressure me to offer it? In case you do, this appears to impinge on my proper to self-determination. I don’t imply to say (right here, not less than) that there is no such thing as a approach of squaring self-determination with the enforceable obligation to offer a service. Moderately, the purpose is that pure rights theorists are inclined to oppose rights to providers partially as a result of such rights appear to make a set of rights incoherent. A part of the enchantment of a coherent system of rights is that it makes workout routines of rights compossible, as Hillel Steiner places it (Steiner 1977, 1994).

A doable set of rights is such that it’s logically unattainable for one particular person’s train of his rights inside that set to represent an interference with one other particular person’s train of his rights inside that very same set. (Steiner 1977, 769)

Programs that see people as having rights that may come into battle are prima facie incoherent. Insofar as ethical claims are to be true, these methods can’t be proper, for contradictions can’t be true. Nevertheless, for a set of compossible rights to have a good time the truth that its rights may be exercised with out contradiction, I contend that advocates of these rights shouldn’t throw their arms up when epistemic questions come up. In any other case, it could be true that in plenty of circumstances just one individual has a proper to do one thing, however a number of brokers could justifiably imagine that they’re performing on their rights given the data obtainable to them. This may increasingly occur even when the brokers are thwarting one another’s actions. The victory of compossibility is thus considerably hole. I believe that the pure rights custom can prolong its benefit over rivals if it might probably say one thing extra about these epistemic questions. I believe that procedural rights could make quite a lot of headway in that regard.

The second argument I need to press is expounded to value. A part of the rationale for attributing rights to others is that rights, as usually understood inside this custom, are the least pricey technique of respecting the truth that others rightly pursue their very own ends (Nozick 1974, 110–11; Lomasky 1987). If one agent should as a matter in fact carry out providers for one more, the agent usually endures a price better than if the agent merely needed to depart the opposite alone. Nevertheless, that is an empirical query, and though it could be true typically, there are exceptions (Mack 2006).

For instance the kind of case I take into account, think about this state of affairs: we’re within the state of nature. You haven’t any cause to imagine that anybody owns a selected part of the woods. You enter this space to get pleasure from its magnificence. I personal this part of the woods, nevertheless. Once you trespass, I, with out warning, set my hounds on you. They severely injure you.

It’s tough to say that you just endured much less value right here than if I had needed to warn you that the land in query was my property and that I used to be ready to interact in a violent eviction. Though the associated fee might need been better for me if I had needed to name out a warning and/or put up some indicators, the associated fee to you within the unique state of affairs is substantial. This kind of factor just isn’t an odd one-off, or so I contend. I believe that there are many real-world circumstances during which rights violators are harmless sufficient that we should always say that they’ve a proper to a warning earlier than enforcement rights are exercised. If we could, with out warning, hurt those that unwittingly violate rights, the associated fee to them in attributing these rights to us is extreme. Though the suitable to enforcement is a crucial a part of having a proper within the first place, the worth of permitting others to implement their rights in sure methods is simply too nice. Modest necessities of warning and proof scale back that value. My declare, then, is that with a view to maintain the prices of respecting these rights down, we should always imagine that brokers have procedural rights.

The third argument I need to supply is explanatory. I argue that procedural rights clarify our reactions in two units of circumstances. First, we regularly don’t anticipate folks to implement a few of their rights. In these circumstances, we would admit that people finally have a proper to take sure programs of motion in opposition to others, however we deny that they could accomplish that with out correct warning. Certainly, those that don’t anticipate to be harmed could defend themselves. Second, I argue that if we’re going to implement our rights in opposition to brokers who’re innocently (or innocently sufficient) unaware that they’ve violated our rights, then we should have proof that these people have completed so earlier than we could search rectification. Epistemic points play a vital position in each of those circumstances.

To start this argument, I need to focus on circumstances during which epistemic points seem solely to be on the periphery. Contemplate the next state of affairs:

Judo 1: Norm doesn’t wish to be touched by different folks. He’s seated on the finish of the bar when Frasier, a newcomer to the saloon, places his arms on Norm’s shoulders. Norm initiates a judo throw, however Frasier blocks it and sends Norm crashing to the ground.

I believe that almost all can have the instinct that Norm’s motion was impermissible however Frasier’s was not. Norm was not merely a jerk; he did one thing that he had no proper to do. Nevertheless, Norm absolutely has a proper to cease others from touching his physique—his private property. But, I believe that Norm’s motion is impermissible in Judo 1. To get at why, think about Judo 2.

Judo 2: Norm doesn’t wish to be touched by different folks. He’s seated on the finish of the bar when Frasier, a newcomer to the saloon, places his arms on Norm’s shoulders. Norm informs Frasier of his need to not be touched and warns Frasier that he’ll violently implement his proper to not be touched. Frasier doesn’t transfer his hand. Norm initiates a judo throw, however Frasier blocks it and sends Norm crashing to the ground.

The overwhelming majority of folks that I’ve run this case by have deemed Norm’s motion to be permissible, whereas Frasier’s was not. What’s the distinction between Judo 1 and Judo 2? Certainly, it’s the warning Norm gave Frasier. Norm improved Frasier’s epistemic scenario in order that Frasier had cause to anticipate a technique of prevention that he beforehand had no cause to anticipate.

This level additionally appears to use to stopping others from accessing one’s extrapersonal property. To see this, think about a modified model of a thought experiment provided by Walter Block (2011).

Shotgun 1: Jeremiah owns some acres of woods. He has laid declare to the land based on all of the native guidelines. Nevertheless, Alexander Supertramp manages to enter these woods with out seeing Jeremiah’s indicators. When Jeremiah sees Alexander trespassing, he shoots him with out calling out any kind of warning.

Most individuals suppose that Shotgun 1 is impermissible. But they’ve exactly the other judgment within the following case.

Shotgun 2: Jeremiah owns some acres of woods. He has laid declare to the land based on all of the native guidelines. Nevertheless, Alexander Supertramp manages to enter these woods with out seeing Jeremiah’s indicators. When Jeremiah sees Alexander trespassing, Jeremiah calls out a warning that if Alexander doesn’t depart he will probably be shot. Alexander refuses to go away, so Jeremiah shoots him.

If Shotgun 2 is permissible, however Shotgun 1 just isn’t, what’s the distinction? I believe the reason is that in Shotgun 2, Jeremiah makes Alexander conscious that he’s violating Jeremiah’s rights.

If we agree with Barnett that the epistemological query doesn’t matter, then we should always say that Judo 1 and a couple of, together with Shotguns 1 and a couple of, are all equally permissible. Norm had the suitable to cease Frasier from touching his shoulder and Jeremiah had the suitable to stop Tom from coming into his property. So, the warnings shouldn’t matter. But that isn’t what most individuals say. This response means that Barnett is mistaken when he says, “You solely have a proper to a process, like some other service, if somebody, e.g. your protecting affiliation has contracted to offer you it” (Barnett 1977, 17). I might need to present you enough causes to imagine that you’re violating my rights earlier than I’ll implement these rights.

I need to push this argument a step additional. I believe there’s a robust case to be made that procedural rights bear on circumstances during which one agent seeks rectification however the different doesn’t have good cause to anticipate to owe it. To get at this case, think about Azaleas 1 and a couple of.

Azaleas 1: Bob awakes to seek out that somebody trespassed in his backyard and trampled his prized azaleas. He’ll lose $500 due to this. Nevertheless, Bob made an inventory of twenty folks he suspects and rolled a twenty-sided die. He then determined that the responsible get together was the individual whose identify corresponded to the quantity on the die. Tom, who was drunk when the azaleas had been trampled, has no concept if he’s responsible. Bob is aware of that Tom retains $500 on his kitchen counter. Bob takes $500 from Tom.

Is Bob’s motion permissible or impermissible?

Azaleas 2: Bob awakes to seek out that somebody trespassed in his backyard and trampled his prized azaleas. He’ll lose $500 due to this. Nevertheless, Bob has a set of dependable safety cameras close to his backyard. He sees Tom from each a hen’s eye view and several other avenue angles. He even compares the footprints within the mud to Tom’s sneakers and discovers that they’re a match. Bob exhibits Tom all of the proof, however Tom refuses to compensate Bob. Bob is aware of that Tom retains $500 on his kitchen counter. Bob takes $500 from Tom.

Is Bob’s motion permissible or impermissible?

Within the first case, it certain appears that Bob has completed one thing impermissible. Within the latter, it may not appear that approach. The distinction is that within the latter case, Bob exhibits Tom that the enforcement of the suitable was permissible. Placing Tom within the epistemic place to see that he violated a proper seems to be the rationale why the extraction of the $500 was ostensibly permissible. In any other case, Tom would have had no cause to anticipate Bob to extract something from him.

I don’t suppose that this ought to be stunning in any respect. From the primary two thought experiments, plainly I’ve to warn somebody that he’s going to undergo a a lot harsher penalty than he had cause to anticipate with a view to guarantee that he’s not an unintended rights violator. Why, then, ought to I not should warn somebody who has no cause to imagine that he violated any rights that he’s about to undergo a penalty for doing so? One who denies that we have now procedural rights would wish to elucidate away this asymmetry. As soon as we grant that individuals have procedural rights, there is no such thing as a asymmetry.

It’s in circumstances like this that the motivation for procedural rights turns into vital. If Tom could resist Bob, however Bob could attempt to extract damages from him in Azaleas 1 since Tom is responsible, the benefit of compossibility falls away—not less than on the sensible stage. I believe that we will say that Bob could not extract damages from Tom in Azaleas 1, although Tom violated his rights. It’s because Bob lacks enough proof to implement his proper to rectification. This preserves the compossibility of rights.

THE SHADOW OF POSITIVE RIGHTS

As I hinted earlier, I believe that a part of the rationale that individuals throughout the pure rights custom are leery of procedural rights is that they arrive very near being constructive rights. Briefly, a constructive proper is normally handled as one thing like the suitable to be equipped with some good or service. Rights to free healthcare, a job, or free school can be constructive rights, for instance. Destructive rights are rights in opposition to interference. The correct to not be murdered, raped, falsely imprisoned, and so forth are all damaging rights. Plainly this concern lurks behind a few of Barnett’s remarks. When he says that you just “solely have a proper to a process, like some other service, if somebody, e.g. your protecting affiliation has contracted to offer you it,” I believe that he implies that we can not have a noncontractual proper to have somebody carry out a service for us (Barnett 1977, 17).

I believe that basic skepticism about constructive rights is nicely based. Nevertheless, there are not less than two explanation why that skepticism doesn’t undermine the case for procedural rights. First, if one makes the judgment that Judo 1, Shotgun 1, and Azaleas 1 had been impermissible, the obvious rationalization throughout the pure rights custom for that impermissibility is that it violates somebody’s rights. In any other case, one ought to say that the actions are blameworthy, irresponsible, imply, and so forth, however permissible. Proponents of pure rights are prepared to confess that not all workout routines of rights are free from blame. A landowner who forces somebody to stroll the perimeter of his subject relatively than cross unobtrusively by way of is, or not less than is likely to be, a jerk. Nevertheless, as soon as we are saying that this kind of conduct is impermissible, we open the door for all types of impermissible actions not constrained by the rights of others. As soon as that occurs, not less than among the freedoms that pure rights theorists defend grow to be imperiled. Maybe authorized paternalism, which many pure rights theorists oppose, turns into permissible.

One more reason why the priority with constructive rights doesn’t have to come up right here is an analogy between procedural rights and issues that proponents of pure rights don’t have any downside accepting. Walter Block, who opposes each constructive obligations and constructive rights, presents a thought experiment equivalent in spirit to those I’ve thought of so far. He writes, “if A sees B stepping on his garden, as a primary step A could not blow B away with a bazooka. Moderately, A should notify B of his trespass, and if B instantly ceases and desists, even perhaps with an apology thrown in, that’s the finish of the matter. It is just if B turns surly, hostile and aggressive, and refuses to budge, that A could correctly escalate” (Block 2011, 5). He concludes that one should implement eviction rights within the “gentlest method doable” (1, 7). He holds that “in countering a rights violation, we need to make sure that we cease simply on this aspect of violating the rights of the rights violator” (5). Certainly, in circumstances of abortion, Block argues {that a} mom could evict a fetus supplied that she notifies “an acceptable company, resembling new adoptive dad and mom, a church, a monastery, an orphanage, Craig’s Listing, and so forth.” (6).

My place and Block’s align in holding that individuals might need to carry out actions earlier than exercising their rights. In that sense, the implications of my argument shouldn’t be problematic. The distinction, if there may be one, is that I’m overtly linking this requirement to the rights of others. Nevertheless, it is likely to be the case that Block additionally acknowledges pure procedural rights and that his gentleness requirement is a way of codifying them in observe. (I’m unsure about whether or not Block thinks this requirement is linked to rights, nevertheless.) His place appears to be that we should evict within the gentlest method doable with a view to keep away from violating rights (Block 2011, 5). We should do that so as to not violate rights ourselves. It is a cheap place and I’ve no downside with it so far as it goes. It appears, for instance, to elucidate the distinction between Judo 1 and Shotgun 1, on the one hand, and Judo 2 and Shotgun 2 on the opposite. Maybe one could not implement one’s rights in opposition to unintended rights violators in the identical method that they could in opposition to intentional rights violators. So, to show to aggression earlier than figuring out that Frasier and Alexander are knowingly violating rights is itself a rights violation. I believe that requirement is a procedural proper.

Block’s place additionally explains the Azalea circumstances. If one should not danger being a rights violator, then absolutely Bob shouldn’t extract fee from Tom with the flimsy proof he has in Azaleas 1. Nevertheless, if we suppose that Tom was responsible of trampling Bob’s azaleas, then plainly Bob had a proper to extract fee from Tom, even when Bob didn’t actually know that he did. Right here, Block has to assert one among two issues. One choice is to say that Bob’s conduct was blameworthy, since he risked violating Tom’s rights, however was not a rights violation, since Tom did owe Bob the $500. If that is Block’s place, he components methods along with his personal characterization of libertarianism: “the person can do no matter he needs to do. Within the libertarian society, he has full freedom. Besides; he can not violate the equal rights of all others, by attacking their our bodies (homicide, rape, assault and battery), or their property (theft, fraud, counterfeiting), and even threaten such actions” (Block 2004, 128). Alternatively, Block can say that Bob’s conduct was a rights violation and that that’s the reason it’s blameworthy. If his place is the latter, then our arguments will not be in rigidity.

Though it’s doable that my view and Block’s are coextensive of their necessities within the circumstances canvassed up to now, I need to argue that Block’s requirement that we implement rights within the gentlest method doable doesn’t go far sufficient. It doesn’t cowl all circumstances during which we would imagine that somebody has procedural rights. Contemplate Azaleas 3.

Azaleas 3: Bob awakes to seek out that somebody trespassed in his backyard and trampled his prized azaleas. He’ll lose $500 due to this. Nevertheless, Bob has a set of dependable safety cameras close to his backyard. He sees Tom from each a hen’s eye view and several other avenue angles. He even compares the footprints within the mud to Tom’s sneakers and discovers that they’re a match. Bob is aware of that Tom retains $500 on his kitchen counter and Bob is excellent at sneaking undetected into folks’s houses (for causes which might be totally legit, fake). Bob research Tom’s habits, waits for the propitious second and sneaks into Tom’s home to grab his cash. Regardless of Bob’s greatest efforts, Tom sees Bob enter his home. Tom calls out for Bob to go away and attracts his pistol. Bob grabs the cash and makes a break for it.

Now, I don’t suppose that I want to complete the story for us to see that not less than one of many people will violate the opposite’s rights right here. It appears to me that we have now responsible Bob for all of this, although he had a proper to rectification. Bob acted as gently as doable, not less than because the phrase capabilities in widespread language. But, given Tom’s epistemic place, he would rightly take himself to have a proper to shoot the fleeing Bob. If pure rights are to be compossible and sensible, then plainly we should always argue that Bob was obligated to let Tom know that he had violated Bob’s rights earlier than searching for rectification. Bob has a proper to rectification; Tom has a proper to defend his possessions. What we want is a way of permitting brokers, when doable, to find out what programs of actions are and will not be rights violations. I don’t see how Block’s gentleness requirement achieves this aim.

One would possibly contend that Tom has a proper to not be made a rights violator. Maybe Bob has made Tom a rights violator by placing him within the place to kill or injure somebody to whom he owes damages. I believe that is proper; I might merely name this a procedural proper. Nozick means that the pure rights place doesn’t inform us what people could do when subjected to unreliable procedures for detecting guilt. There is no such thing as a apparent cause to not prolong this to unreliable strategies of recovering one’s property. I additionally suppose that this isn’t how the phrase mild capabilities in atypical language. (I can gently steal, for instance.) Bob is being mild; he’s not going to do bodily hurt to Tom. However any well-functioning courtroom system would acquit Tom within the case I’ve described.

CONCLUDING MATTER

It is likely to be that the content material of procedural rights is to a level culturally knowledgeable. If folks in an space do implement their property rights violently and with no extra warning than, say, an indication indicating that it’s non-public property, then others have good cause to anticipate that enforcement. In that regard, they don’t have any procedural rights in opposition to that type of enforcement. Nevertheless, this doesn’t change the purpose that when people both don’t have any cause to anticipate enforcement or a selected stage of severity in enforcement, then there are good causes to imagine that they’ve procedural rights. Native behavior can solely inform what one has good cause to anticipate. Thus, these rights will not be cultural or political rights; they’re rights that every one brokers have.

Alongside these identical strains, it is very important see what I’m, and am not, saying. I’m not arguing that one has a proper to see video proof that one is responsible earlier than others could implement their rights to rectification. Such a precept would have precluded most individuals in human historical past from implementing their rights. I’m arguing that there should be some enough stage of proof provided to the individual topic to punishment, not less than when the individual is innocently (or innocently sufficient) unaware of whether or not he violated rights. The shape that proof would possibly take could differ, however that isn’t stunning. In spite of everything, Nozick tells us that ideas of justice in switch could differ throughout completely different societies (Nozick 1974, 150). He additionally tells us that social guidelines could take sundry kinds (322–31). I don’t see why one thing related couldn’t occur with procedural rights.

This text has argued that we have now rights not merely in opposition to sure forms of conduct, however to learn that we’re rights violators and topic to rights enforcement. To be able to defend the compossibility of rights, to maintain down the price of respecting rights, and to elucidate our reactions to the vignettes I constructed, I’ve argued that we should always prolong the scope of rights to incorporate two issues. First, people have rights to learn that they’re topic to rights enforcements that they don’t have any cause to anticipate from others. In any other case, people could resist, having inadequate cause to anticipate anybody to implement these rights. Second, people have a proper to be warned that they’re topic to extra extreme penalties than they’ve cause to anticipate. These are pure procedural rights.

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